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The Opportunity Cost of Monetary Conviction:
A Comparison of the DSI and the S&P 500
By Melissa Arms
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the numerous types of mutual funds that
have developed in the past decade, few have grown
as fast or received as much attention as socially
responsible funds. SRI’s (short for socially
responsible investments) are funds that allow the
investor to consolidate his or her ethical and moral
convictions with their financial goals. This new
wave of “putting your money where your mouth
is” allows one to purchase stocks that support
businesses which produce jobs, support fair trade,
strengthen communities, guard the environment and
spurn unhealthy practices (alcohol and tobacco).
Morningstar reports that total assets in SRI mutual
funds have doubled over the last two years with the
number of SRI funds now approaching 50, up from
just 15 in 1991. The industry itself has grown from
a $40 billion to a $639 billion industry with almost
one in every ten U.S. dollars invested in such funds.
(Perryman)
SRI funds subject their investment universe
to a series of social and financial screens that ensure
the portfolio is consistent with the consumers’
personal belief system. These screens can be
negative, positive or activist. Although admirable
from an ethical standpoint, the financial viability
and performance of such funds is questionable; basic
financial theory espouses that a limited investment
universe equates with limited returns. Socially
responsible investors should, therefore, expect to
take a loss for their monetary conviction. On the
other hand, a growing pool of theory maintains that
socially responsible investing could be more
lucrative than traditional investing due to market
inefficiencies and the strength of the underlying
firms. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to
determine whether socially responsible investors
take a loss for their monetary convictions by
delineating the theory between these two opposing

hypotheses and determining which has more
statistical validity.
A. Pro-Market Theories vs. Pro-SRI Theories
The first set of theories (called pro-market
theories) are based on the widely accepted principals
of basic finance and support the hypothesis that the
general market should out-perform socially
responsible investment funds. The second set of
theories (dubbed pro-SRI theories) support the
hypothesis that Socially Responsible Investments
should theoretically produce greater returns than the
general market. The remainder of this paper will
review these two sets of theories, examine similar
studies from the recent past and then present the
mechanics of the current research along with the
research findings. The final section will offer a brief
conclusion and suggestions for future research.
B. Brief History of Socially Responsible
Investing
As early back as the 1920’s, religious
organizations and church groups prohibited
investment into what they considered “sin stocks,”
or stocks in the liquor, tobacco and gambling
industries. One of the first “sin screened” funds was
the Pioneer Fund in Boston which eliminated all
investments into alcohol, tobacco and gambling
companies. Although such a simple screen would
not be considered a purely “ethical screen” today, it
still serves as a milestone in the alignment of belief
and investment.
Modern-day ethical investing is most often
attributed to the great activist movements in the
1960’s. At this time, the profound political changes
that were influencing the nation were also shaping
the way in which people began to invest their money.
With a growing disdain for corporate America and
animosity towards the United States’ involvement
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where r = a stock’s expected return, rf = the risk free
interest rate, beta = the covariance of the stock in
the market portfolio and rm = the market’s expected
return. r-rf then becomes the expected risk premium
from a stock and rm-rf is the expected market risk
premium. (Peterson) An investment’s return is
simply its expected profitability that changes
according to varying performance scenarios; risk is
essentially measured by beta and measures the
certainty or uncertainty
with which one can expect
to receive a given return.
II. THEORY AND
Modern
portfolio
theory
posL I T E R AT U R E
An investment’s value,
therefore, hinges on its
REVIEW
its that the use of decisionThe underlying
expected return and the
making
criteria
other
than
likelihood that such a
theory concerning the
return will be realized. The
two above hypotheses
risk, return, diversification
long-term relationship
can be viewed as
and efficiency will limit the
between risk and return
spanning two general
tends to be positive and
schools of thought. For
amount of potentially lucrasimplicity’s sake, they
linear; the greater the risk,
tive investments and thereby
the greater the return and
will be referred to from
vice versa. In sum, an
here on as pro-market
reduce the chances of comefficient portfolio will have
theories and pro-SRI
piling
a
truly
efficient
portthe highest expected return
theories.
for a given level of risk or
folio.
A. Pro-market theory
the lowest risk for a given
return level. (Hylton, 19)
The essence of
The last important component of the
this theory espouses that the returns received from
argument is diversification. Risk comes in two
socially responsible investments will be less than
forms, diversifiable (or systematic) and
those produced by the general market (i.e. the
non-diversifiable
(or
unsystematic).
market will outperform SRI’s). To understand the
Non-diversifiable risk is the part of total risk that is
basis of this theory it is important to understand the
related to changes in the general economy and stock
mechanics of traditional investing/portfolio creation
market which are out of any investor’s hands and,
and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The
therefore, cannot be exterminated through portfolio
CAPM maintains that if capital markets are efficient,
diversification. In theory, the market rewards (via
traditional investing should produce a more
high returns) only portfolios that have eliminated
attractive risk/return ratio than SRI. The goal of
all non-diversifiable risk. By definition then, an
basic portfolio creation is to amass the highest
efficient portfolio is one in which the investor has
possible return for some given level of risk.
abolished all unsystematic risk and only systematic
Non-systematic risk can be diversified away in order
risk remains.
to increase the efficiency of the portfolio. Therefore,
Modern portfolio theory posits that the use
understanding the concepts of risk, return,
of decision-making criteria other than risk, return,
diversification and efficiency are essential to this
diversification and efficiency will limit the amount
argument.
of potentially lucrative investments and thereby
The elements of risk and return form the
reduce the chances of compiling a truly efficient
basis of the CAPM. It states that r-rf = beta(rm-rf)
in the Vietnam War, college students, clergy, civil
rights activists and eventually traditional consumers
coalesced to ensure their investments did not support
the war. As time progressed, socially responsible
investors began to screen the companies in which
they invested for broader initiatives such as
environmental practices, whether the company
supported apartheid in South Africa and the way in
which the firm handled its employees.
(www.goodmoney.com)
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portfolio. Langbein & Posner (1980) argue that a
portfolio created along the lines of social principles
will be less diversified than one constructed under
the guise of high return and profit maximization.
Lack of diversification means higher risk for a given
return level. The CAPM suggests that the general
market will out-perform SRI’s due to the amount
of nonsystematic risk inherent and uncompensated
for in social, ethical or political investment
decision-making. The negative screens used in many
SRI funds prohibit investment in certain companies
or industries and therefore, according to the CAPM,
make it impossible to eliminate systematic risks.
(Langbein & Posner, 85)
In sum, the CAPM model combined with
efficient market theory posits that inclusion of
screens other than those based on risk and return
limits a portfolio manager’s investment universe and
increases the occurrence of systematic risk. This
increase translates into less return for any given level
of risk or greater risk for a given level of return.
(Langbein & Posner, 85)
If socially responsible investing results in a
portfolio with an unacceptable amount of systematic
risk and lower returns, an alternative option known
as the “separation theorem,” states that investors
should separate their personal preferences from their
standard investment criteria. According to this
theory, investors will maximize their income only
by investing in the stocks with the highest return for
a given level of risk and then investing the excess
return in some charitable contribution of their
choice. This maximization theory, however, is based
on a stricter consumption/investment line and is
dependent on the perfectly efficient functioning of
capital markets. (Hylton, 19-20)
Teper (1991) supports this theory by
asserting that there are five principal reasons why
socially responsible portfolios would have lower
risk-adjusted returns than the unrestricted general
market. The first reason is that lower individual
security returns could occur when better performing
stocks are “black listed” and poorer performing
stocks are consequently overweighted in the
portfolio. If socially responsible stocks do perform
poorly, the SRI portfolio then has absolute lower
returns due to the poor performance of the

underlying stocks and relatively lower returns due
to the positive performance of “irresponsible” stocks.
The second reason stems from the tendency
of socially responsible funds to remove large
companies from their portfolios and replace them
with smaller, more volatile firms. This occurs most
often because large firms embody a number of
process lines, products and subsidiaries, any one of
which may fail to meet socially responsible
guidelines. The volatility of small firms’ earnings
compared to larger, more established firms can be
substantial and, therefore, increases the riskiness of
SRI portfolios. Sauer (1997) supports this idea
stating that “social screens tend to eliminate larger
firms from the investment universe and, as a result,
remaining firms tend to be smaller and have more
volatile returns. Lower returns are also possible as
social screens eliminate stable blue chip ...
investment opportunities.”
Teper’s third explanation for the lower
returns of SRI’s stems directly from the above
discussion on diversification, maintaining that social
investment criteria force the portfolio to be
underweighted in major industries or sectors thus
resulting in lower portfolio diversification. For
example, the majority of SRI’s prohibit investment
into the nuclear power industry. Social portfolios
will therefore receive less returns than the general
market when the nuclear industry booms.
Teper also notes that the transaction costs
of social screening, like the initial cost of eliminating
non-qualifying stocks and adding others, can
disadvantage restricted portfolios such as SRI’s.
Finally, he also suggests that the opportunity cost
associated with eliminating an entire investment
class (such as international investments because they
are too difficult to monitor) can hinder the
performance of SRI’s.
A. Pro-SRI theory
Theoretical arguments supporting socially
responsible investing (often termed “doing well
while doing good”) extend from a myriad of places.
Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) report that
expected returns from socially responsible portfolios
may be higher than the expected returns of
conventional portfolios if a large-enough group of
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investors continuously underestimate the likelihood
According to Hylton (1992) in some cases the social
that socially “irresponsible” businesses will be
screening process may act as a proxy for the type of
subject to negative information. They support such
risk examinations that traditional fund managers
an idea with the hypothetical situation of oil
use. Consequentially, it may be possible under
companies. If traditional investors consistently
certain political conditions for SRI funds to
miscalculate the chances of oil companies having
out-perform their “irresponsible” peers. Hylton gives
spills, the price decline in oil company stock when
the example of South Africa-free investments which,
such a spill does occur will reward SRI funds. In
according to Pensions and Investments in October
other words, the funds which ban oil stocks will
of 1989, performed substantially better than
perform better due to the relatively lower returns
traditional funds for a significant period of time.
now received by conventionally diversified
Although it is possible that the portfolio mangers of
portfolios maintaining oil stocks. This is essentially
anti-South Africa funds were simply more able stock
the
counter-argument
to
Teper ’s
choosers than traditional portfolio managers, a more
lower-diversification reasoning.
logical explanation is that South-Africa screens
Sauer (1997) reports that the firms which
became a proxy for eliminating high risk
remain after a social screening process may be
investments into such a politically torn and intense
financially stronger and more profitable than those
area as South Africa in the 1980’s. Undoubtedly,
eliminated due to a number of current business
even traditional investments into firms with South
dynamics. For example, firms that are already
Africa ties avoided an area so greatly affected by
environmentally friendly will be less likely to endure
international political and economic sanctions. As
governmental fines, enviro-lawsuits and the loss of
this demonstrates, the greater the popular pull and
business, from environmentally aware consumers.
general compliance behind a specific screen, the
Social screens that
greater its usefulness as a
account for product
proxy for omitting stocks
quality and customer
shunned
by
even
Firms
which
remain
after
a
satisfaction will also leave
traditional investors. This
social screening process
behind firms that are least
holds for positive screens
likely to endure liability
into “green” (i.e.
may be financially stronger
lawsuits and costly
environmentally friendly)
and more profitable due to
settlements. Additionally,
companies where “green”
funds screened for firms
could possibly be a proxy
a number of current busithat adhere to good
for “unusually prudent
ness
dynamics,
such
as
corporate citizenship
management,” more
standards maintain equity
efficient processes and
lower
probabilities
of
legal
in firms with strong firm
increased demand for
trouble
and
higher
levels
of
loyalty and, thus, higher
“green” products by
product sales. Firms with
Eco-conscious consumers.
customer
satisfaction.
strong employee relations
Hylton views this as one
will also be in a better
reason for the green
position to attract and
Parnassus Fund’s superior
retain quality employees. SRI advocates argue that
performance to the DJIA. (Hylton, 36)
employee loyalty translates into greater productivity
Both Lowry (1990) and Kinder (1993)
and innovation along with a lowering of production
argue a similar line of reasoning, maintaining that
costs. Ultimately all of the above characteristics
socially responsible screening is a perfect tool for
translate into greater profit potential for socially
choosing financially viable and well-performing
screened firms.
stocks because of its emphasis on the long term
This is in-line with Hylton’s proxy theory.
rather than the short term. In theory, socially
24
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responsible funds will perform better inasmuch as
socially responsible fund managers shun investment
decisions based on short-term profits in favor of an
accent on long-term gains from investments in
stable, growing companies. (Lowry, 54) The socially
responsible portfolio manager then views the
mechanics of publicly traded corporations as an
owner does. Performance is not simply limited to
quarterly or annual financial statements, but rather
expanded to consider the long-term ability of a firm
in an increasingly dynamic and socially aware
market. According to Kinder, focusing on long-term
viability requires a clear understanding of how the
company relates to society at large; social screens
evaluate this relationship and invest accordingly.
(Kinder, 10- 12)
Hylton points out, however, that the
advantage that such an edge gives to socially
responsible funds will only last until traditional
investors understand and embrace it. In an efficient
market, this is the only way for SRI funds to perform
better than the general market.
The above theories function under the
auspice of efficiently functioning financial markets.
However, a large number of studies over the last
decade have proposed that it is possible for
non-CAPM strategies (such as SRIs) to perform well
due to inefficiency in the markets created by
speculative booms. This “inefficiency hypothesis”
is in direct contrast of CAPM prospects and is based
on a growing number of studies that question the
empirical and theoretical basis of efficient markets.
(Hylton, 24) According to Schleifer & Summers
(1990) the inefficiency hypothesis notes that some
investors “chase the trend” by buying stocks after a
rise and selling after a fall. The basis of this premise
is that market prices sometimes deviate from market
fundamentals when investors who are chasing trends
(as opposed to acting solely on market information)
produce speculative booms or “bubbles” in the
market. Some arbitrageurs will actually buy certain
stocks with rising prices in order to feed the interest
of other investors, then sell out near the top and take
the corresponding profits. The result is market prices
which are not based on the fundamentals assumed
by the efficient market hypothesis and nontraditional
investors may do better than the general market

while this “bubble” process is occurring. (Schleifer
& Summers, 25-28) It is important to note here that
if the market is not efficient in this sense, the
separation theory does not hold.
III. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In nearly every major investing periodical,
a myriad of short-term statistical comparisons
between traditional and socially responsible funds
exists. Most of these, however, are of limited use
due to their restrained time horizon or the confined
number of stocks they use for comparison. For
example, simply to state that SRI Fund #1 had a
3% greater return than the Dow Jones for a 6-month
period in 1995 tells us little of the possible benefits
or costs to overall social investing. In order to define
studies relevant for comparison to present research
it is important that the studies have a substantial
time horizon and a large pool of funds under
consideration. Owing to the weight that much of
the pro-market theory places on risk-adjusted
performance measures, adjusting results for risk is
also an important aspect of comparison.
Additionally, as Henningsen (1992) states, “the goal
in measuring quantitative performance is to compare
apples to apples, not apples to oranges. In addition,
you need to know the difference between a Granny
Smith and a Golden Delicious” (Henningsen, 282).
In other words, when evaluating the performance
of an equity portfolio the stocks both in the portfolio
and in the benchmark index should parallel each
other in terms of size capitalization, industry type,
risk etc. Interestingly, there are a poor number of
studies that currently fulfill the above stipulations
and those that do have reached mixed and
inconclusive results.
The CDA/Wiesenberger Mutual Funds
Update of January 31, 1993 compared 10 socially
responsible mutual funds to the average long-term
mutual fund over five and ten year periods ending
in 1992. The study found that the returns for
restricted and unrestricted returns over 5 years were
15. 1 % and 15.0% respectively. Over the 10-year
period the average restricted social fund returned
12.7%, while the average unrestricted, traditional
account returned 13.1%. Clearly, the difference
between SRI funds and their respective fund
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averages were not immensely different. The study
does point out, however, that socially responsible
funds performed worse compared to the average 5
and 10-year returns of the general market (measured
by the S&P 500) which were 15.8% and 16.1%
respectively. Morningstar also reported that between
1988 and 1993 the average mutual fund earned 1%
more than socially responsible mutual funds.
(Goldberg, 4) However, none of these results are
adjusted for risk considerations and are, therefore,
difficult to interpret.
Mueller (1991) compared the returns of
both unrestricted, traditional mutual funds and ten
socially responsible mutual funds over a four-year
period in the mid-1980’s. She found that the
risk-adjusted returns of socially responsible funds
earned an average of 1.03% less than their
unrestricted counterparts (t-value = -3.83).
Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) amalgamated the
performance of all socially responsible mutual funds
which were in the Lipper Analytical data bank as
of December 1990. Their study used Jensen’s alpha
(a measure of the average risk premium for one unit
of systematic risk) to evaluate the risk-adjusted
returns of SRI funds and found that for all socially
responsible mutual funds that had existed for at least
five years, nine displayed negative alphas and eight
showed positive alphas. This is to say that of the
seventeen SRI funds in existence for five or more
years, over half performed worse than the general
market on a risk- adjusted basis. However, only one
of the positive alphas and one of the negative alphas
was statistically significant. They also found that
these seventeen funds earned excess returns of
-0.76% per year and -0.063% on a monthly basis.
The monthly excess return was, again, not
statistically significant from the return on
conventional mutual funds (-0.14%) of the same
time period (t-value = -0.92). Results for those
socially responsible mutual funds in existence for
less than five years were similar; they earned
average yearly excess returns of -3.33% per year
and -.277% monthly. The performance of these
fifteen socially responsible mutual funds were not
statistically different (t-value = 0.85) from their
traditional counterparts (0.042%). The empirical
results, when conclusive, will have shown that, on
26
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a risk adjusted basis, socially responsible funds
perform equally as well or slightly less than
unrestricted funds.
IV. DATA
The purpose of this research is to determine
what cost, if any, today’s investors pay for applying
socially responsible criteria to their investment
decisions. As shown above, most studies in the recent
past have tended to concentrate on comparing the
performance of restricted, socially responsible
mutual funds with their unrestricted mutual fund
counterparts. The nature of mutual funds makes it
difficult to tell from these studies the basic cost of
adding social screens to investment decisions. This
is in part because mutual fund returns are a
combination not only of the underlying security
returns, but also of widely varying transaction costs
and managers fees. The last two variables are
entirely individual-fund specific. Mutual fund
returns are also highly dependent on the
decision-making skills of the manager regarding
asset allocation, sector selection and security
selection. All of the above render a comparison
between mutual funds difficult for determining the
strait cost of applying a “social conscience” to
investment choices. (Sauer, 140) It is for these above
reasons that I will compare the S&P 500 and the
Domini 400 Social Index.
The Domini 400 Social Index (DSI) was
first launched by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and
Co. in May 1990 as the first common stock index
in the U.S. representative of the broad market and
designed to reflect the performance of portfolios
subjected to multiple social constraints. (Kinder,
1992) KLD used twelve social screens that reflected
the broad concerns of many different social
investors. Hence, some investors will apply more
or less screening to their personal investments based
on preference. The screens are divided into five
primary screens which are deemed so because they
are the first screens applied and the first to develop
historically. The primary screens include:
Military Contracting: no company may derive
more than 4% of revenues from military weaponry
sales.
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Alcohol and Tobacco: no company may drive
more than 4% of gross revenues from the
manufacture of tobacco products or alcoholic
beverages.
Gambling: no company may derive 4% of gross
revenues from gambling equipment, services or
paraphernalia.
Nuclear Power: no company may own, operate,
or receive 4% of sales from the nuclear power
industry.
South Africa: no company may have operations
in, nor be widely perceived to aid , the enforcement
of the apartheid system in South Africa.
The secondary screens, applied after the primary
screens, control for the response of firms to the
demands of today’s society. The DSI aims to include
companies that have taken notably positive
initiatives or exclude companies that have fallen
below generally accepted standards in the following
areas: (It is important to note that many of these
decisions are difficult to make concrete).
Environment: In sum, DSI excludes companies
with major environmental problems, takes the
middle ground when considering whole industries
and looks for companies with aggressively positive
environmental policies.
Product Quality and Attitude Toward
Customers: DSI looks for firms with a high ratio
of value to cost and with W. Edwards Deming’s
continuous improvement paradigm. It excludes
companies with major product liability cases and
looks for long-standing commitment to customer
service.
Corporate Citizenship: Multiple screens that
consider a company’s philanthropic record and
interaction with the community, such as innovative
giving and public/private partnerships.
Employee Relations: Considers a company’s labor
record, workplace safety, equal opportunity

employment, quality of benefit programs,
profit-sharing plans, etc.
Women and Minorities: Includes companies with
notable progress on the advancement of women and
minorities. Excludes companies with substantial
affirmative action fines, but not companies with
less-than-perfect advancement records.
Once developed, these screens were applied to
the Standard and Poor’s 500 with the stocks of
“failed” firms removed. In order to maintain a
similar industry composition, smaller capitalization
companies with superior social responsibility
records were then added and, finally, to maintain
similar capitalization structure, large-capitalization
companies with strong social records in
underrepresented industries were added. Two tables
presenting the over and under weighted industries
relative to the S&P are listed in Appendix B.
Because the DSI and the S&P are not
actively managed funds, a comparison of the two
will provide a strong indication of the costs of
“monetary conviction” because neither is impacted
by the perplexing effects of actively managed
socially responsible mutual funds. As an index , the
DSI does not reflect management fees, transaction
costs or investment policy changes. Changes to the
DSI are made only in regards to concerns of a firm’s
social responsiveness and not in response to the
general market. In other words, the returns of the
DSI reflect only the returns of the underlying
securities and it has been designed to depreciate the
potential side effects of socially responsible
investing. In this study, average monthly returns
from the DSI between May 1990 to September 1998
will be compared with those from the unrestricted
and well diversified S&P 500 which is also not
actively managed. A total listing of average monthly
returns for each index are located in Appendix A.
V.EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND
RESULTS
This study will utilize a series of tests, both
normal and risk-adjusted, to gather empirical results
concerning the risk and return of the two portfolios.
The first set of tests will compare the normal return
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and risk of the two indices by calculating the average
both would appear to be inaccurate. As the table
monthly return and standard deviation of monthly
above indicates, the F-test was only 0.49, meaning
returns for each portfolio. (Standard deviation of
that the difference between the two standard
monthly returns is used to represent a portfolio’s
deviations is not significant at the 0.05 level.
risk.) In order to gauge
Therefore, it cannot be
whether the difference
proven that the difference
Table 1: Te s t
between the two portfolios
between standard deviations
D SI
S&P
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
is statistically significant, a
is due to something other
T-test and F-test will be run
than random chance.
Average
1. 5 4 4 9 6
1.413317
on the returns and standard
Both of the above
Monthly Return
deviation, respectively.
tests help show that applicaBecause pro-market theory
tion of social screens to inStandard
4.074672
3.804176
relies so heavily on
vestment decisions did not
Deviation
risk-adjusted returns, a
consistently increase or deT
T
e
s
t
0
.
8
1
3
5
5
6
second set of tests which
crease returns relative to the
calculate the coefficient of
general market on a normal
F- Test
0.4933911
variation and the Sharpe’s
basis between 1990 and
Index will be used.
1998. Likewise, and even
more interesting, is the fact that there is not enough
A. Results of Normal Tests
statistical support to prove that social screens result
The average monthly returns of the DSI for
in a greater amount of risk to the investor, contrary
May 1990 to September 1998 are 0.132 higher than
to popular belief.
those of the S&P 500, but are not statistically
significant (t-score 0.814, See Table 1). This means
B. Results of Risk Adjusted Tests
that it is not statistically possible to prove that the
As detailed above, a great proportion of
differences between the
pro-market theory rests on
returns of the two indices
the inability of socially
are not due to random
responsible investing to
Table 2:
DSI
S&P
chance rather than
produce acceptable risk/
DSI vs. S&P
underlying
theory.
return ratios, a problem that
Average
Return
1.544960
1.413317
Therefore, it is not possible
the above statistics do not
to prove empirically that
address. Therefore, the next
Standard Deviation 4.074672 3.804176 section will consider the
either pro-market or
pro-SRI investing produces
interaction of risk and return
greater normal returns.
by comparing the coefficient
Coefficient of
2.637396 2.691665
Comparison of the
of variation and the Sharpe
Variation
standard deviation of the
value for each portfolio.
portfolios’ returns shows
The coefficient of
that the variability of returns from the DSI is greater
variation is one of the most commonly used and
than that of the S&P (4.07 and 3.80 respectively).
basic determinants of a portfolio’s risk/reward
The statistical significance of these returns is also
characteristics. The coefficient of variation gives
interesting. If the pro-market contention is that
the amount of risk (variability in returns) that an
limiting the investment universe by socially
investor undertakes per one unit of return. A higher
screening portfolios hurts investors by lowering
coefficient of variation means a riskier portfolio
returns and increasing volatility and pro-SRI
relative to the amount of return. (Clark & Clark)
theorists believe social screens increase the quality
The results for the DSI 400 and the S&P 500 are
of the underlying stocks and hence the size of returns,
listed below:
28
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As the above figures indicate, the DSI and
As the above table indicates, socially
S&P are at relatively the same position regarding
responsible investors are receiving a 29% risk
risk and return according to the coefficient of
premium (i.e. return) per unit of total risk while the
variation test. However, it is interesting that
general market returns only a 27% risk premium
according to these figures investors in the DSI
per unit of systematic risk. While the actual
accepted 0.06% less risk per
significance to the average
unit of return for investing
investor of such a small
in socially responsible funds
difference is debatable, it is
Table 3:
DSI
S&P
rather than the general
certainly a surprising result
Sharpe Value
market between 1900 and
when one considers that such
Average
1998. Although the
a finding contradicts the
1.554960
1.413317
Monthly Return
difference is unquestionably
basic efficient portfolio
small and, therefore, unable
theory. Although the
Risk Free Rate
0.390625
0.390625
to support pro-SRI theory, it
difference between the two
(Monthly)
certainly contradicts the
portfolios is not enough to
Standard
result expected by
firmly support pro-SRI
4.074672
3.804176
Deviation
pro-market theory. Once
theory, it is enough to show,
again, the difference
once again, that applying
Sharpe Value 0.2857491 0.268834
between the two portfolios
socially responsible criteria
appears to be negligible.
to investment decisions does
This figure, however, does not control for what is
not necessarily negatively affect risk-adjusted
known as the “risk free rate,” or the average monthly
returns.
return that an investor would receive if s/he invested
in only 90-day treasury bills, the least risky of assets.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER
For this comparison the Sharpe value is useful.
RESEARCH
Sharpe’s Value (or Index) is an appropriate
The purpose of this study was to identify
measure of risk exposure because it considers total
whether socially screened portfolio’s, as represented
risk and states results in terms of return. If applying
by the DSI, out-perform or under-perform the
socially responsible criteria to investment decisions
general market, as represented by the S&P 500.
limits the investment universe, then pro-market
Contrary to pro-market theory and some past
theory maintains that investors may subject
research, the above research indicates that socially
themselves to otherwise diversifiable risk. The
responsible investors do not necessarily experience
Sharpe Value gives the average risk premium
an opportunity cost for expressing their monetary
(amount in excess of that obtained when investing
conviction. As was expected, socially responsible
in purely riskless assets) per unit of total risk. For
funds do exhibit higher variation in returns.
this reason it represents a strong risk-adjusted
However, even though socially responsible
measure of performance for investments in portfolios
portfolios are less diversified by pro-market and
that might be under-diversified. The Sharpe Value
traditional standards, the above studies show that
is calculated by S= [Ri-RFR] / Vi. Where S is the
in the current market, socially responsible
Sharpe Value; Ri is the average monthly return on
investments performed as well, if not minutely better,
the portfolio of interest; RFR is the risk free rate (in
than the general market. The non-risk adjusted
this case the average monthly returns for 90-day
return for socially responsible investments was
T-Bills as reported in Ibboston’s Stocks Bonds Bills
0.13% higher than that of the general market and
and Inflation 1997 Yearbook) and V1 is the
2% higher on a risk-adjusted basis. The empirical
standard deviation of returns to the portfolio
evidence would therefore seem to indicate that, at
squared. The Sharpe Values for the DSI and S&P
least for the years 1990-1998, investors did not take
500 are as follows:
a loss from applying social screens to their
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investment decisions. The small difference between
the two portfolios indicate that, contrary to
pro-market and pro-SRI theory, the market does not
seem to over or under-weigh the importance of
socially responsible investment screens to any
significant degree. Therefore, socially responsible
investors can pursue their moral goals without
forsaking their financial goals. It should be noted,
however, that this applies only to broad applications
of screens and that the performance of different types
of SRI’s may differentiate from these results.
On a final note, the above research compiled
all socially responsible investment vehicles into one
category. It would be interesting to see how socially
responsible growth funds perform relative to
traditional growth funds, etc. It would also be
interesting to see what types of monetary convictions
are more lucrative, i.e. the relative performance of
different types of social screens. Do strictly
environmental, strictly “sin-free,” or multiple screen
funds perform better? Additionally, there are
hundreds of ways in the financial world to assess
risk and risk/reward characteristics. It would be
informative to know how the general market and
socially responsible investments perform relative to
each other based on eight or even ten of these
methods and then to assess the differences/
appropriateness of each measure. Undoubtedly, in
a world where confidence in political structures is
waning and the power of transnational companies
grows rampantly and unabated, the attractiveness
of “voting with your dollars” will increasingly
become an attractive option to the socially aware
and investment conscious generations to follow. If
it can be proven that socially responsible investing
is in fact lucrative and effective, as it appears it may
be, responsible companies may see more fit to
respond to the demands of the common investor
rather than the campaign dollar.
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Appendix A: Monthly Returns of the DSI and S&P 500
Mth-Yr
May-90
Jun-90
Jul-90
Aug-90
Sep-90
Oct-90
Nov-90
Dec-90
Jan-91
Feb-91
Mar-91
Apr-91
May-91
Jun-91
Jul-91
Aug-91
Sep-91
Oct-91
Nov-91
Dec-91
Jan-92
Feb-92
Mar-92
Apr-92
May-92
Jun-92
Jul-92
Aug-92
Sep-92
Oct-92
Nov-92
Dec-92
Jan-93
Feb-93
Mar-93

DSI
10.97
-0.75
-2.65
-9.79
-5.46
-0.85
8.08
3.54
5.33
7.06
4.52
-0.02
4.13
-4.863
5.519
3.14
-1.97
1.032
-2.95
12.87
-0.942
1.622
-2.557
0.796
1.103
-1.96
4.659
-1.464
2.16
2.36
4.177
1.804
1.386
0.795
2.279

S&P
9.75
-0.7
-0.32
-9.03
-4.92
-0.37
6.44
2.74
4.42
7.16
2.38
0.28
4.28
4.57
4.68
2.35
-1.67
1.343
-4.042
11.434
-1.857
1.282
-1.947
2.914
0.537
-1.45
4.085
-2.047
1.18
0.35
3.405
1.227
0.836
1.363
2.11

Mth-Yr
Apr-93
May-93
Jun-93
Jul-93
Aug-93
Sep-93
Oct-93
Nov-93
Jan-94
Feb-94
Mar-94
Apr-94
May-94
Jun-94
Jul-94
Aug-94
Sep-94
Oct-94
Nov-94
Dec-94
Jan-95
Feb-95
Mar-95
Apr-95
May-95
Jun-95
Jul-95
Aug-95
Sep-95
Oct-95
Nov-95
Dec-95
Jan-96
Feb-96
Mar-96

DSI
-4.553
3.057
0.186
0.014
3.974
-0.451
1.898
-1.087
2.616
-1.82
-4.475
1.074
1.08
-2.24
2.72
4.37
-2.43
1.83
-2.697
0.556
3.373
4.114
2.475
2.499
3.888
3.194
3.406
0.355
4.026
0.206
4.561
0.822
3.14
1.747
0.196

S&P
-2.417
2.675
0.293
-0.402
3.794
-0.767
2.069
-0.953
3.4
-2.72
-4.36
1.282
1.64
-2.45
3.28
4.1
-2.45
2.25
-3.671
1.461
2.6
3.879
2.953
2.93
3.952
2.352
3.334
0.272
4.199
-0.353
4.402
1.879
3.44
0.961
0.958

Mth-Yr
Apr-96
May-96
Jun-96
Jul-96
Aug-96
Sep-96
Oct-96
Nov-96
Dec-96
Jan-97
Feb-97
Mar-97
Apr-97
May-97
Jun-97
Jul-97
Aug-97
Sep-97
Oct-97
Nov-97
Dec-97
Jan-98
Feb-98
Mar-98
Apr-98
May-98
Jun-98
Jul-98
Aug-98
Sep-98

DSI
1.793
2.567
0.252
-4.484
2.971
5.877
2.27
7.822
-2.119
7.474
0.686
-4.442
7.663
5.441
3.787
8.892
-5.672
5.533
-3.134
6.131
1.832
2.111
7.476
4.253
0.69
-1.83
5.16
-0.462
-14.807
6.605

S&P
1.473
2.577
0.406
-4.453
2.124
5.621
2.737
7.591
-1.957
6.208
0.802
-4.159
5.966
6.138
4.397
7.943
-5.542
5.453
-3.291
4.587
1.69
1.132
7.186
5.133
1.04
-1.74
4.062
-1.063
-14.436
6.476

Av.Ret. 1.54496 1.413317
Std. Dev 4.074672 3.804176
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Appendix B: Over and Under- Weighted Industries of the DSI Relative to the S&P
Underweighted industries in the DSI 400 Relative to the S&P 500
(As a % of Portfolio Market Value)
International Oil
Electric Utilities
Drugs, medicine
Aerospace
Producers of goods
Tobacco
Foreign petroleum reserves
Motor vehicles
Chemicals
Liquor

-4.49
-3.88
-2.78
-2.03
-1.72
-1.64
-1.52
-1.27
-1.21
-1.15

Overweighted Industries in the DSI 400 Relative to the S&P 500
(As a % of Portfolio Market Value)
Nonfood Retail
Insurance (excluding life)
Services
Banks
Beverages
Miscellaneous finance
Publishing
Hotels, restaurants
Apparel, textiles
Life insurance
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6.45
2.55
2.25
2.11
1.82
1.59
1.41
1.21
1.08
1.00

